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Global Britain and the narrative of empire.1  
Oliver Turner, 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract 
Since 2016, the UK government has outlined plans for Global Britain as a framework for post-
Brexit foreign policy. Some criticise the idea as a vision of “Empire 2.0”, but it is rarely made clear 
exactly what form it takes or what its wider political implications are. This article argues that Global 
Britain constitutes not just an idea or a slogan, but a foreign policy narrative and, more specifically, 
the narrative of empire. To appear reasonable, its grand ambitions require pre-existing knowledges 
of past imperial “successes” and accepting images of empire among the British public. Yet Global 
Britain lacks efficacy: as a domestic rather than an international narrative; by being inherently 
regressive in its worldview; and for contradicting the preferences of international partners on 
which the UK heavily relies. These narrative flaws, it is argued, make Global Britain an actively 
problematic, rather than merely ineffective, component of UK foreign policy.    
 
Key words 







                                                          
1 The author thanks Ryan K. Beasley and Charlotte Rommerskirchen for helpful comments and 






Since the UK referendum in June 2016 and its decision to leave the European Union, debates over 
the nation’s place in global affairs have intensified. Throughout the Brexit process, politicians, 
academics, journalists and others have provided assessments on what leaving the EU (and indeed 
remaining within it) would mean for the UK’s international significance and standing. In October 
2016 former Prime Minister Theresa May formalised the slogan Global Britain, as ‘an ambitious 
vision for Britain after Brexit’ in which the UK would govern itself, advocate free trade, promote 
peace and prosperity, and protect the interests of itself and others.1 Global Britain has been 
endorsed by government departments and ministers ever since. 
Some argue that support for Brexit emerges broadly from imperial nostalgia or dreams of 
“Empire 2.0”. The project, they claim, is an impossible attempt to recapture a position in global 
affairs the UK occupied before the collapse of its empire and entry into the EU. To a lesser degree, 
these arguments are extended to Global Britain and the foreign policy blueprint it claims to 
provide.2 As with Brexit, tying endorsements for Global Britain to empire is typically done 
pejoratively, to criticise its proponents as unrealistic or even delusional. But if Global Britain is 
akin to a ‘dead colonial fantasy’,3 where exactly do we find it and what particular form does it take? 
Moreover, what are the implications of its apparent imperial motivations for UK foreign policy 
and engagement with international partners, whether it leaves the EU or not? This article addresses 
these questions to bring focus and substance to debates about the meanings and applications of 
Global Britain since 2016. It does so in two interconnected ways.  
First, it concentrates on the UK government’s understandings of Global Britain, primarily 
as laid out in a dedicated 2018 memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
Addressing loose descriptions of the term as a notion, an idea, a concept and so on, it is argued 
that Global Britain is most usefully conceived as a foreign policy narrative, and more specifically 
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the narrative of empire. As such, Global Britain is principally authored as a “painkiller” in 
anticipation of domestic trauma following the loss of EU membership, just as the British 
Commonwealth once was to assuage the loss of empire, and is thus purposefully marketable rather 
than unwittingly delusional. The lofty ambitions for Global Britain, moreover, require knowledges 
of past imperial “successes” and accepting images of empire among the British public in order to 
appear meaningful and justifiable. The focus falls on how this narrative of empire applies to UK 
post-Brexit ambitions in one of the three global ‘centres’ of political and economic activity 
identified by the FCO as central to Global Britain’s future: Asia (or the Indo-Pacific). 
Second, the article examines the efficacy of Global Britain and the framework for post-
Brexit foreign policy it ostensibly presents, with a continued focus on how it is received in Asia. It 
is argued that the framework is fundamentally flawed for at least three reasons. First, as a domestic 
rather than an international narrative, Global Britain was never envisaged as a viable foreign policy 
programme. Second, as a narrative of empire it is inherently regressive rather than progressive, 
assuming a world which increasingly no longer exists. Third, and most importantly, Global Britain 
contradicts the preferences of international partners on which it relies so heavily to achieve its 
goals. It is argued that Brexit has re-ignited an impassioned identity crisis within the UK, bringing 
disagreement and political deadlock over what the nation is. Simultaneously, however, it has 
brought comparatively pragmatic, clear-eyed assessments of the UK’s strengths and value from 
non-EU partners in regions like Asia, from which we learn much about the place and role(s) it 
occupies in modern day global affairs, but which have largely been ignored in Whitehall. 
Misalignments between the underlying, enduring self-narrative of Global Britain - from which the 
foreign policy slogan has recently emerged - and the priorities of key partners, it is asserted, are 
critically important to the UK’s future prospects, whatever the outcome of Brexit.   
 
Unpacking Global Britain: The narrative of empire 
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For a time after its emergence in late 2016, there were few clear articulations of what Global Britain 
was understood to represent. To date, a 2018 memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) to the UK’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee constitutes the best 
resource from which to unpack the British government’s intended meanings of, and ambitions for, 
Global Britain.4 In it, the FCO explains that Global Britain would adapt to leaving the European 
Union, ‘to continue to be a successful global foreign policy player, and to resist any sense that 
Britain will be less engaged in the world’. To this end, Global Britain  
 
‘is intended to signal that the UK will…continue to be open, inclusive and outward 
facing; free trading; assertive in standing up for British interests and values; and 
resolute in boosting our international standing and influence. It is a Britain with global 
presence, active in every region; global interests, working with our allies and partners 
to deliver the global security and prosperity that ensures our own; and global 
perspectives, engaging with the world in every area, influencing and being influenced. 
 
To realise these visions, Global Britain must be ‘influential in all regions’, especially within ‘the 
three centres of the global economy and political influence’: the United States, Europe and the 
Indo-Pacific.  
 As already noted, some argue that Global Britain reflects nostalgia for the British Empire 
and dreams of recouping a lost imperial presence. Those who criticise as unfounded this 
assertation that Global Britain (and indeed Brexit) is driven by visions of Empire 2.0 are in 
important respects correct; few, if any, of those in positions of responsibility seriously consider 
that the British Empire can or should be resurrected. The argument here, then, is not that Global 
Britain has been conceived as a rebirth of empire. It is that Global Britain is the narrative of 
Empire, with important consequences.  
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Narratives are a form of discourse which convey stories about the world and the actors 
within it. They contain characters and plotlines, but are at least partly autobiographical, bringing 
normative constructions of political “realities” around us. As such, they present the narrator’s own 
opinions about what is normal and right as matter of fact. Narratives provide comforting and 
reassuring stories about “our” identity, where “we” come from, and “our” purposes and 
aspirations. ‘Having a secure autobiography, a firm grasp on our past and our history’, notes 
Subotic, ‘provides a sense of stability and allows us to move forward’. To be convincing, moreover, 
narratives are manufactured and selective, emphasising elements of the story while omitting others. 
This in turn means narratives can enable and restrict conceivable policy choices, by convincing 
their audiences of appropriate (and inappropriate) courses of action. Finally, any given narrative 
does not exist in isolation, and can often be found embedded within everyday discourses to ease 
communicability.5 Identifying Global Britain as a narrative, rather than an idea, a notion, etc. helps 
us unpack its nature, purposes and significance.   
In the twentieth century, the Commonwealth of Nations brought under its umbrella most 
of the former colonies of the British Empire as they gained independence, primarily throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s. The Commonwealth was presented as ‘empire in contemporary form’. It was 
‘a painkiller’, sold to the British public to ease the shock of losing global power and authority with 
promises of imperial levels of international control and prestige.6 (Such ambitions would go 
unrealised, and the UK’s motivations to join the EEC in the 1960s are traced partly to realisations 
that the Commonwealth was a less significant source of trade and prosperity than originally 
believed). 
 Today’s narrative of Global Britain is in many important respects a painkiller to ease 
potential suffering from leaving the European Union. The shock from Brexit to the UK’s political-
economic foundations may be as significant as any experienced during the twentieth century,7 and 
official government projections point to contractions of the UK economy outside the EU. ‘Some 
elements of our interaction with the rest of the world will change’, the FCO – as the narrative’s 
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key author - acknowledges in its memorandum on Global Britain. Accordingly, the UK ‘will lose 
some elements of the force multiplier advantages of EU membership’. Since 2016, then, and just 
as the Commonwealth of Nations once was, Global Britain has been sold as empire by another 
name via compensatory promises of authority and prestige – of being ‘active and influential in 
every region’, from a ‘global presence’ which would enable it to help deliver ‘global security and 
prosperity’.  
 Global Britain is criticised by some as an impracticable vision to retrieve something which 
has been irretrievably lost. Yet, intended as a painkiller, the narrative of Global Britain is less 
accidentally delusional than it is purposefully marketable; members of Britain’s foreign services are 
well versed on the limits of state resources and capabilities, making the insistence that Global 
Britain can ensure ‘our adversaries are aware of our capacity for protecting our national interest, 
remaining an activist global player in projecting our values, supporting the rules-based international 
order, and leading efforts to ensure global peace and security’, far from misinformed. Rather, it is 
a largely autobiographical narrative crafted to reassure, with a familiar, soothing story about the 
UK as a nation with truly global attributes and aspirations, and networks of allies and partners, to 
ease an expected shock not from the loss of Empire but the loss of EU membership.  
The central aims for Global Britain are in many ways ambiguous and underdeveloped, with 
the term representing an empty signifier. Empty signifiers are in themselves devoid of meaning. 
Ripe for interpretation, they only make sense once attributed meaning by others. Global Britain 
could thus be taken at face value, appealing to visions of the ‘open, inclusive and outward facing’ 
post-Brexit Britain the FCO describes, with little consideration for imperial legacies. Yet the stated 
ambitions for Global Britain only appear reasonable and justifiable in practice if collective 
memories of empire are there to lend them credence.  
Global Britain, then – like most narratives - does not operate in isolation. It complements 
long-running narratives of Global Britain which predate 2016, to eras in which it was taken for 
granted that the UK, by virtue of its empire, exerted extensive international authority and 
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influence, enjoying a ‘global presence’ commensurate with the words of the FCO today. Empire, 
in other words, is the still-beating heart of Global Britain, giving its bombastic rhetoric logic and 
meaning. Indeed, Global Britain quietly draws strength from overtly favourable or 
accepting/ambivalent images of empire among the British public. In 2016 for example, 43 percent 
of Britons considered their empire to have been ‘a good thing’, with 25 percent believing it was 
neither a ‘good’ nor a ‘bad thing’. Just 19 percent expressly considered the Empire to have been a 
‘bad thing’.8  
This explains much about Global Britain’s ambition. It is highly questionable whether its 
aims could ever be realised, a point made by the UK’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee report when it noted that ‘the slogan must be backed by substance’. This is especially 
pertinent when the UK’s foreign services, including the FCO and Ministry of Defence, have 
experienced sustained budget reductions since around 2010. Restrictions on their abilities to exert 
British influence abroad are also highlighted in the Foreign Affairs Committee report. Yet the 
endurance of empire in the British imagination is such that its “achievements” can override 
knowledges of ongoing budget restrictions, as well as government projections that the UK 
economy would expand more slowly outside the EU, to make persuasive the possibility of an 
approaching - or perhaps returning - Global Britain. 
Thus, while the FCO’s memorandum on Global Britain never actually mentions the word 
empire, it does not have to. The British government can avoid controversy the term brings through 
careful manipulation of the narrative, relying instead on understandings and interpretations empire 
leaves behind. When outlining the importance of India to future UK involvement in Asia, for 
example, it euphemistically explains that ‘influence and access’ are gained by virtue of ‘a shared 
past’ and ‘strong people-to-people links’. It also points to the ‘major advantage’ the UK boasts of 
‘global reach through our diplomatic network’, and ‘the huge advantage of being part of the 
Commonwealth, allowing us to engage with a wide network of countries…with a similar history, 
legal heritage, and institutions’.  
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In such a way, Global Britain simultaneously embraces and denies the existence of empire. 
On the one hand, Global Britain can appear feasible only with an appreciation for what empire 
bequeathed the twenty first century UK: a ‘shared past’ with countries it colonised, an unusually 
wide diplomatic reach achieved largely through intercontinental imperial administration, and a 
grouping of nations which operate according to laws and procedures formulated by Britain to 
replace their own. On the other hand, for Global Britain to succeed its narrative must be attentively 
managed, with its imperial foundations erased from immediate sight.  
Yet, as the narrative of empire Global Britain’s historical inspirations are always close to 
the surface, and its primary reference point is an imperial era defined mainly by “successes” in the 
non-Western world. As a result, Global Britain is grounded in arguments about economic 
opportunities in India, China, wider Asia, and the Commonwealth. In a 2016 speech to promote 
Global Britain, Boris Johnson when Foreign Secretary argued that a post-Brexit UK should take 
advantage of opportunities beyond Europe, ‘beginning with some of those dynamic 
commonwealth economies that are already queuing up to do free trade deals’. This message has 
been echoed by others, including Theresa May during her leadership.  
The FCO also stresses that a post-Brexit UK would support ‘the rules-based international 
order’. Yet rules are as political as they are legal, and the international order the FCO envisions is 
an ideational construct which exists as much in the imagination as in judicial texts. That “order” 
has long been primarily of Anglo-American design, expanded and sustained beneath the umbrellas 
of Pax Britannica and then Pax Americana. However, while the leading rule-making institutions of 
the UN, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and others remain Western-dominated 
and Western-based, today’s shift in the global political economy sees power residing elsewhere and 
new multilateral institutions and organisations emerging (not least in Asia), with established centres 
of legal power eroding. For Global Britain to unequivocally support ‘the rules-based international 
order’, then, points to a normative autobiographical narrative written not to endorse rules per se, 
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but the rules of a (intrinsically imperial) Western-based system it considers right and the way things 
should be.       
 
The efficacy of Global Britain 
While the UK government’s post-2016 narrative of Global Britain is seductive and comforting, 
with selectivities to mask its imperial foundations and boost its acceptance, it is flawed as a foreign 
policy blueprint for at least three interconnected reasons. First, Global Britain is in essence a 
domestic rather than an international narrative; as a painkiller for traumas expected in the event of 
Brexit, it has never been envisaged as an implementable policy programme. With its principal 
intended audience the British public, Global Britain is inherently inward-facing as a party-political 
rallying call to voters more than a serious foreign policy strategy. This is reflected in its 
aforementioned lack of operational detail, but articulations of the key elements of Global Britain, 
such as in a February 2019 speech by former Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson, further expose 
its domestic configurations. Williamson’s speech, delivered in London rather than in the welcome 
of an international partner for maximum attendance by the British media, was an overview of 
global security challenges along with a salutation to UK armed forces. Few new policies or 
announcements were made, with focus instead on reassurances that the UK would remain a global 
security actor. 
The second flaw is that, as a narrative of empire, Global Britain is fundamentally regressive 
rather than progressive, promoting engagement with a world which increasingly no longer exists. 
As already seen, the particular ‘rules-based order’ the UK essentialises is rapidly evolving, and 
projections that a post-Brexit UK would ‘lead efforts to ensure global peace and security’ and be 
‘influential in all regions’ require knowledges of past imperial “glories” for meaning. Broader 
anachronisms of Global Britain also contradict the interests of international partners. For instance, 
plans for a post-Brexit UK to engage more actively with the Commonwealth received a lukewarm 
response; in 2016, Commonwealth Secretary General Patricia Scotland argued that the EU and 
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Commonwealth were not competitors, and that ‘partnership is a much better way forward’. 
Scotland noted that she was unaware of any appetite throughout the Commonwealth for Brexit. 
The Commonwealth may be a source of post-imperial pride for the UK, but its members prioritise 
regional relationships and those with giant outliers like the United States, China and indeed 
Europe; most have either signed or begun to negotiate free trade agreements with Brussels. For 
Global Britain to prioritise the Commonwealth over the EU would ultimately be out of step with 
the worldviews of both institutional memberships.     
The third and perhaps most important reason for why Global Britain fails as a foreign 
policy programme is that, as indicated above, it fundamentally contradicts the understandings and 
preferences of international partners about what the modern-day UK represents. Scholarly debates 
as to exactly what the UK constitutes in global affairs have existed for decades, since at least the 
collapse of the British Empire. Since then, the UK has been labelled a “great power”, a “former 
superpower”, and a “middle-ranking European power”, among others. ‘When Britain lost an 
Empire’, argues Graham Leicester, ‘…it lost an identity based on the projection of “Britishness” 
overseas’.9  
The UK’s decision to leave the EU brought this long-simmering identity crisis to the boil. 
(The British government has itself been informed that Brexit has generated a ‘role crisis’ for the 
UK10). The Brexit referendum produced an almost 50-50 split in domestic public opinion. 
Prolonged and fractious parliamentary deliberation followed, defined by conflict and indecision 
over what type of Brexit the UK should pursue and whether the UK should exit the EU at all. 
Indecision and deadlock twice resulted in delays to Brexit. Those who prefer that the UK remains 
in the EU tend to argue that the nation has been anchored to Europe for its own benefit, with a 
relatively modest international profile more vulnerable without Union membership. Those who 
advocate that the UK leaves the EU more commonly argue that Brexit would free it of bureaucratic 
oversight which shackle its potential, returning sovereignty over trade, currency and military-
security arrangements, and enabling it to recapture independence and a lost sense of self by re-
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engaging with the world on its own, very capable, terms. Britain’s highly polarised Brexit debates, 
then, have ultimately been less about the EU, or even UK membership, than they have been 
continuations of long-running contestations about what the UK actually is.  
Typically lost within this domestic discursive milieu however is that Brexit has forced an 
unusually raw and in-depth interrogation of the UK’s twenty first century place and function. It 
has been argued that ‘no-one knows what Britain is anymore’, with its partners in Europe most 
bewildered as they witness a ‘sudden nervous breakdown’ which has left the UK ‘unrecognisable’.11 
Importantly however, Brexit has also prompted key partners – notably beyond Europe in priority 
regions like Asia - to deliver considered, matter-of-fact assessments of the UK’s international 
presence which bring relatively clearer understandings of its identity than the UK holds of itself. 
The nation’s identity crisis can thus appear less perplexing when the comparatively sober and 
utilitarian assessments of others are considered. By extension, we learn much about how well the 
self-narrative of Global Britain translates in the wider world, and with what effects.  
It is argued elsewhere that the space and role the UK occupies today (particularly, but not 
exclusively, within Asia) is best conceived not in terms of quantitative power as a “great” or 
“middle” power, but by its qualities of power. Specifically, the UK today represents a ‘facilitator’ 
and ‘subcontractor’. As a facilitator, long-standing, influential positions in multilateral institutions 
and organisations such as the EU (but also the WTO, UN, and World Bank), enable it to act for 
others, as a “gateway” into the lucrative economic markets of Europe and corridors of political 
power of global governance. As a subcontractor, the UK brings a select range of skills and 
specialisms, in finance; international bureaucracy; security (weapons sales and broader security 
expertise); education and others. It is argued that Brexit would more negatively impact the UK’s 
status as facilitator than subcontractor.12             
In an open letter to London and Brussels, for example, the Japanese government provided 
the most comprehensive statement of any Asian country on what it considers the primary 
challenges to its interests from Brexit. Tokyo, like others, perceives the UK as among the most 
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liberal trading voices in Europe through an historical aversion to protectionist measures, with its 
letter affirming that the UK’s value lies firmly in its “gateway” status to Europe and the cross-
channel movement of goods, services and people.13 In the months preceding the UK’s Brexit 
referendum, the leaderships of (Indo-Pacific) partners including China, India, Australia and New 
Zealand spoke of the benefits they derive from Britain’s facilitating membership of the EU. 
Japan also called for a ‘strong, united Europe’ within a ‘global order now beset by 
challenges’. These perceived challenges revolve primarily around China, which Tokyo fears is now 
steered only by the world’s most capable actors, such as the European Union. The EU boasts little 
regional military significance, but its collective voice on norms and laws of sovereignty, territory, 
trade, the environment and others make it a valuable ally. Tokyo considers Brexit, and by extension 
the UK’s visions for an “independent” Global Britain, detrimental to Europe’s authority at a time 
of rapid global change.  
Japan also expects that the UK’s own ability to provide meaningful diplomatic influence 
over Beijing - via Brussels but also international organisations such as the UN whose operations 
are driven not insignificantly by regional partnerships and alliances – would weaken with Brexit. 
In 2019, Japan’s ambassador to the UK explained he was ‘perplexed’ as to why the UK was leaving 
the EU. Such confusion is traced to ingrained understandings of the UK as a valuable, successful 
facilitator with which Japan shares productive - European - relations. Brexit, indeed, has been 
promoted via images of hyper-globalisation and a world which enables Global Britain to enjoy 
international omni-presence with partners on every continent in relationships of its choosing. 
Largely absent from these debates has been the enduring importance of regionalisation and the 
power of geography, from where today’s Global Britain derives much of its facilitating value.  
   Interpretations of the UK as a subcontractor, with prized specialisms across a core set 
of industries and arenas, also speak to the faults of Global Britain as a foreign policy blueprint and 
a narrative whose authors have paid little attention to the views of those it requires to achieve its 
aims. The FCO envisions an ambitious ‘All of Asia’ policy, for example, in a region where it is 
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‘continually looking for opportunities to expand’. As observed earlier, the narrative of Global 
Britain, with its primary reference point an imperial past, also assumes that economic opportunities 
await an enterprising UK in the non-West, in India, China, with members of the Commonwealth, 
and so on. Yet the Brexit process to date has helped to confirm that the priorities of those in Asia 
(and elsewhere) are not simply for increased trade.  
With the UK now a minor trade partner to most Asian countries by virtue of both 
geography and size, regional governments seek alternative gains. In November 2016, India’s Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi explained that a post-Brexit bilateral trade deal required increased visa 
numbers for Indian students to the UK education system. This was an immediate illustration of 
the centrality of such niche areas as higher education to perceptions of the UK’s purpose and 
identity, and the misalignment between the ambitions of Global Britain and the priorities of 
international others.  
China is also less interested in a trade deal than in employing UK proficiencies in banking 
and finance. This explains Beijing’s enthusiasm for the annual UK-China Economic and Financial 
Dialogue (EFD), and its aims to promote the renminbi in global currency markets through 
London, as articulated most recently in joint EFD statements of 2016, 2017 and 2018. These aims 
of China to promote the renminbi are not incommensurate with the stated goals of Global Britain. 
However, a cancelled meeting in 2019 between UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond 
and his counterparts in China - apparently after protest from Beijing over a decision by the UK 
Ministry of Defence to sail a new aircraft carrier through the Pacific alongside references to ‘those 
who flout international law’ – additionally demonstrated how the aims of Global Britain to be 
‘active in every region’ can collide with the preferences (whether justified or not) of partners on 





Global Britain is more than a notion, an idea, or a vision for UK international engagement, and 
more than the foreign policy blueprint it purports to provide. It is an autobiographical narrative 
about what Britain is and what it envisions the world and its actors to be. This is an important 
distinction because narratives are not simply descriptive and they rarely stand alone; they are 
performative and interconnected, written to construct particular realities and shape policy choice. 
Global Britain narrativises a world of opportunity which an entrepreneurial UK is ready to 
embrace. It does this to calm public unease in anticipation of (especially economic) trauma in the 
form of Brexit, as a narrative which, to rephrase Subotic, encourages stability to allow the country 
to move forward. As the narrative of empire however, Global Britain requires knowledges of 
imperial “achievements” not just to acquire meaning, but to validate its grand ambitions.  
This matters because while the tagline of Global Britain may disappear from public 
discourse once a new government is elected, and/or when the outcome of Brexit is determined, 
deeper narratives of Global Britain will endure in alternative forms. They will do so whether or 
not the UK leaves the European Union, as long-running debates about the post-imperial UK 
persist and evolve. The importance of this is firstly in recognising that today’s Global Britain is as 
much a statement of identity as it is of policy. It is also in recognising the legacies of empire which 
subtly pervade UK political and foreign policy discourse. As this article has shown, these legacies 
encourage fundamentally regressive conceptions of the world that exist in a mutually-reinforcing 
relationship with wider public opinion; perhaps ironically, the purpose and meanings of Global 
Britain today are largely detached from the rapidly changing world around it. The UK’s House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee worries that Global Britain will remain an empty slogan if 
not backed by further resources. The more significant problem is that, since 2016, Global Britain 
has already revealed a broad and highly problematic mismatch between its sense of self and the 
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